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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
runs counter thereto, whether such legislation pertains to capital,
labor, or any other subject. ' 13 The provision which the court of
appeal held to be superseded by the Constitution is one of the
absolute prohibitions contained in R.S. 23:841. Although all of
those prohibitions are incorporated into R.S. 23:844(4), 14 the
remainder of that section consists of procedural requirements,
the validity of which were not at issue in the Twiggs case. In
the instant case the court confined the authority of the legislature
to regulate the issuance of injunctions even further by invalidat-
ing the procedural requirements of R.S. 23:844 because they
prevented the granting of "immediate" relief.'5 There were no
absolute prohibitions involved.
If the decision declaring the procedural provisions of R.S.
23:844 "illegal and ineffective" is not limited to the particular
facts of the case, grave doubt will be cast upon all legislative
limitations on the issuance of the various writs. Especially vul-
nerable to attack would be the many absolute prohibitions which
the legislature has imposed. 16 Surely the Supreme Court did not
intend to cast such doubt upon the validity of these statutes.
Because the Constitution itself contains no detailed procedural
rules governing the issuance of writs by the courts, it would be
unfortunate if the legislature were unnecessarily limited in its
power to enact needed rules of procedure in this field. Therefore,
it is hoped that the rule laid down in the instant case will be
confined to the particular facts there involved.
Billy H. Hines
TORTS-PERSONAL INJURY OR WRONGFUL DEATH SUITS BY CHILD OR
ADMINISTRATOR AGAINST PARENT
A minor driving the family automobile negligently caused
the death of his minor sister. The administrator of the deceased's
estate sued the father of the minors to recover damages for
wrongful death. Held, suit dismissed. The Kentucky wrongful
13. Id. at 302, quoted with approval in Douglas Public Service Corp. v.
Gaspard, 74 So.2d 182, 186 (La. 1954).
14. Before issuing an injunction the court must find as a fact that none
of the relief to be granted is prohibited by LA. R.S. 23:841 (1950).
15. The court stated in dictum that "procedural statutes will be upheld in
our courts so long as they do not violate our basic law." 74 So.2d 182, 187
(La. 1954). It is difficult to see how this statutory regulation violates "basic
law" any more than do the numerous other statutes referred to above.
I6. See note 9 supra.
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death statute only entitles the administrator to institute such
actions as the deceased could have maintained, and public
policy would have prevented the minor from maintaining a
suit against her father for personal injury. The fact that the
father was insured is immaterial. Harralson v. Thomas, 269
S.W.2d 276 (Ky. App. 1954).
In the early common law, husband and wife were regarded
as a single juridical entity, but this was never true of parent
and child.' Actions by children to recover property from their
parents have frequently been permitted,2 and while the English
reports apparently contain no successful personal injury suits
by children against their parents, such suits do not seem to
have been prohibited. 3 The so-called common law rule that an
unemancipated minor cannot sue its parent for personal injury4
is traceable to the American case of Hewlett v. George,5 decided
in 1891. The Mississippi court in that case, relying on no prece-
dent, merely stated that a contrary rule would be detrimental
to the "peace of society."6 The reason most frequently offered
in support of the rule is that allowing the child to maintain a
suit for injury against the parent would undermine "parental
authority."7 This could mean that parents should be free to
discipline their children without fear of incurring civil liability.
If so, then it seems that the rule should extend only to suits by
minors for the intentional torts of the parent. If it means in-
1. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 1030, 1056 (1930); Albrecht v. Potthoff, 192 Minn. 557, 257 N.W. 377
(1934); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930), and authorities
therein cited.
2. Duke of Beaufort v. Berty, I P. Wins. 703, 24 Eng. Rep. 579 (1721);
Morgan v. Morgan, 1 Atk. 489, 26 Rep. 310 (1737); Alston v. Alston, 34 Ala.
15 (1859); Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 Atl. 292 (1924); Faulk v.
Faulk, 23 Tex. 653 (1859); Myers v. Myers, 47 W.Va. 487, 35 S.E. 868 (1900).
3. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 905 (1941); Dunlap v. Dunlap,
84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930), and authorities therein cited.
4. Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Schneider v.
Schneider, 152 Atl. 498 (Md. App. 1930); Damiano v. Damiano, 6 N.J. Misc.
849, 143 Atl. 3 (1928); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923);
Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Atl. 198 (1925); Roller v. Roller, 37
Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905); Securo v. Securo, 110 W.Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750
(1931); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
5. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
6. Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
7. Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Matarese v. Mata-
rese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Atl. 198 (1925); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac.
788 (1905); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927); cf. Luster v.
Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938), in which the court expressed fear
of the effect of third parties' intermeddling in familial relations, and Mc-
Curdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030,
1072 (1930), in which is brought out the danger of prosecution by the child
of stale claims against the parent is pointed out.
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stead that the tranquillity of the family scene would be dis-
turbed by the child's engaging in the prosecution of a suit against
the parent, then it would seem that the prohibition should also
extend to suits by minors to recover property from their par-
ents. It has also been argued that the rule should not apply
in cases of intentional torts of a heinous character, since the
authority of the parent and the tranquillity of the family are
irreparably disrupted by the tort itself.8 It seems absurb, for
example, to refuse recovery to a minor girl forcibly raped by
her father for the reason that the "family fireside" might suffer.9
One jurisdiction prohibits child-parent suits because they strike
at the peace of the family, but permits husband-wife suits which
cause an equal family disturbance. 10 The extensive use of lia-
bility insurance has introduced a new factor in the problems
of interfamily litigation. In a suit by the child against his
insured parent, the financial structure of the family would not
be shaken in the event of recovery." Far from having a dis-
ruptive influence on the family, such a suit might be so wel-
come as to lead to collusion between parent and child.12 Al-
though this danger of fraud would seem to be the soundest
basis for denying recovery in such cases, it is questionable that
wrongs should be ignored simply to avoid the difficult task of
separating fraudulent claims from the well-founded. 1 The prob-
lem is accentuated in jurisdictions having a so-called Direct
Action Statute permitting suits against the tortfeasor's insurer
without joinder of the insured. One jurisdiction has refused to
sustain a child's direct action against his parent's insurer for
personal injury.14 Another has intimated that such an action
would lie.'5 It is apparent that these considerations suggest no
ready solution to the problem of child-parent litigation.
8. See Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S.W. 133 (1913); Clasen v.
Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150
Atl. 905 (1930); Securo v. Securo, 110 W.Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931). See also
dissent in Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 588, 118 S.E. 12, 17 (1923).
9. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
10. The problem is dealt with in Owens v. Auto Mut. Indemnity Co.,
235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937).
11. Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932); cf. Fidelity & Cas-
ualty Co. v. Marchand, 4 D.L.R. 157 (1924).
12. PROSSER, A HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 908 (1941); McCurdy, Torts
Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1072 (1930); of.
Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. App. 1953); Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y.
106, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939).
13. Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. App. 1953).
14. Owens v. Auto Mut. Indemnity Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937).
15. Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 Atl. 753 (1929).
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Plaintiff in the instant case urged upon the court the effect
of the parent's insurance, presumably to dispel the notion that
recovery by the deceased child's estate would merely transfer
family funds from one pocket to another. The court considered
the presence of insurance immaterial and apparently attached
no importance to the fact that the suggested reasons for the rule
of parental immunity appear in a somewhat different light in
actions for the wrongful death of a minor. For example, if the
need for preservation of parental control over the plaintiff child
were the only consideration in child-parent suits, then that
consideration would disappear with that child's death. On the
other hand, since the administrator of the deceased's estate in
wrongful death actions is usually a member of the immediate
family, the same danger of creating a litigious atmosphere within
the family, and the same danger of collusion between parent
and administrator are presented as where the injured child
himself sues. Aside from these considerations, however, the
decision seems well supported by authority, since under the
Kentucky wrongful death statute, the deceased's administrator
is deemed to have no greater right of action than the deceased
had.16
In Louisiana, under Article 104 of the Code of Practice, an
unemancipated minor cannot sue a parent during the lifetime
of that parent. Whether or not the Louisiana Direct Action
Statute1'7 can be employed to circumvent this disqualification
has not been decided. However, in Edwards v. Royal Indemnity
Co.,' 8 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the husband's
insurer could not invoke the husband's immunity under Article
105 of the Code of Practice against an action by the injured wife.
By analogy, it seems probable that the Louisiana courts would
also permit a minor or the administrator of his estate to sue
the parent's insurer for personal injury or wrongful death.
Patrick T. Caffery
16. Ky. R.S. 411.130 (Supp. 1953).
17. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950).
18. 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935).
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